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Damn!1 
1.  What does damn mean when thus uttered in isolation?  Perhaps a linguist could 
show that there is a tacit direct object—we do nearly equivalently say “Damn it”—and possibly 
that there is a higher subject, “God” (though the latter idea is refuted syntactically by Quang 
(1971)).  The utterance would further be a hortatory subjunctive, “Let/may God damn 
[whatever].”  But that is not the normal use; sincere utterers of “Damn” need not believe in 
God, nor urge that He actually condemn a particular object to Hell.  David Lewis (1972, p. 209) 
proposed to analyze “Hooray” as “I cheer X,” but that was contrived at best; absent syntactic 
evidence to the contrary, when I shout “Hooray” I have not either asserted a proposition or 
made a performative utterance having propositional structure.   
Unlike hooray, ouch, good gracious, oh, dear, amen, or ha ha, damn can also function as 
an adjective contributing syntactically to a containing sentence: “That damn cat has pooped in 
the roasting pan”; “You haven’t done a damn thing.”2  In such sentences damn is not merely an 
interjection; “Susan consulted—damn!—a fortune-teller” is fine, but “Susan consulted damn a 
fortune-teller” is ungrammatical.  Likewise for goddam, and as before, “That goddam cat has 
pooped…” does not (even metaphorically) mean “That cat has been condemned to Hell by God 
and has pooped….”  Goddam is expressive only, despite its quite determinate syntactic role.  
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The same applies to fucking; statistically few uses of that word mean anything about sex acts, 
or indeed anything that contributes to a truth condition.   
Following David Kaplan (2004), I shall call such linguistic items—that is, those which are 
words of particular languages and have syntactic properties but do not seem to contribute to 
truth-conditional or propositional meaning but only express things— “expressives.”  They form 
a surprisingly wide and diverse category, and the term is not felicitous for all of its 
subcategories.  Of recent interest, of course, are slurs and other pejorative expressions.   
It must not be simply assumed that slurs are a special case of expressives; we shall 
consider arguments against that assumption in section  xx  below.  But I shall begin my 
exposition with some further words on expressives, in order to introduce my central 
explanatory notion.    
2.  I here propose a view according to which expressives work by a particular type of 
conventional implicature.  Other such views have been put forward, as by Potts (2005), 
Williamson ((2009), (2010)), McCready (2010), Whiting (2013), and Deigan (2013), but, 
understandably, those authors’ ideas of “conventional implicature” are not all the same and do 
not work in the same ways.  –Understandably, because Grice (1975, pp. 44-45) introduced the 
term without definition in one short paragraph, and used an inappropriate or at least confusing 
example3; the rest of us have each made of it what we will. 
What I have made of it (Lycan (1984), Ch. 5) I call “lexical presumption.”  Here are some 
data of the sort that originally motivated my notion.    
(1) a. Jane is a sloppy housekeeper and she doesn’t take baths either.  
             b. ?!Jane is a neat housekeeper and she doesn’t take baths either.  [Lakoff (1969)4] 
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(2) a. Jane has just succeeded in proving Goldbach’s Conjecture, and her husband is very 
brilliant too.  
             b. ?!Jane just added 2 and 2 and got 6, and her husband is very brilliant too. 
(3) a. Jane considered going to the dentist, but decided to enjoy her day off instead.  
      b. ?!Jane considered taking a pleasant ride through the countryside, having a 
wonderful dinner, and seeing a movie, but decided to enjoy her day off instead. 
(4) a. Jane proved Goldbach’s Conjecture and she’s smart.  
      b. ?!Jane proved Goldbach’s Conjecture {but / and yet} she’s smart. 
(5) a. Jane is very lucky and very happy. 
      b. ?! Although Jane is very lucky, she is very happy.   
(6) a. Mr. Blifil is sober. 
      b. ?!Even Mr. Blifil is sober.  [Entirely inappropriate when Blifil is the last person one 
expected to be not sober.5]  
(7) a. Who is Jane?  
      b. ?!Who is this pebble? 
In each case except (7), what is actually said remains constant, but there is an 
unmistakable difference in implication.  Nor is the implication merely a matter of 
conversational implicature or of relevance-theoretic adjustment, for it is noncancellable in 
Grice’s sense:     
(8) *Jane has succeeded in proving Goldbach’s Conjecture, and her husband is very 
brilliant too; you have to be pretty stupid to prove things. 
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(9) *Jane considered taking a pleasant ride, but decided to take a pleasant ride instead. 
(10) *Jane knows that Goldbach’s Conjecture is true but she’s smart; of course learning 
things like Goldbach’s Conjecture means you are smart. 
(11) *Although Jane is very lucky, she is very happy; mind you, all lucky people are 
happy. 
(12) *Even Mr. Blifil was sober; he’s a famous teetotaler. 
(13) *Who broke this vase?—a falling lamp, I bet. 
 
3. What explains these noncancellable but seemingly not truth-conditional implications?  
In each case, what seems to be doing the work is the choice of a certain word:  either, too, 
instead, but, yet, although, even, who.  That word cannot be used unless a certain factual 
assumption is made.  If the assumption is not granted, the choice of word is ruled 
inappropriate.  Those words, over and above their truth-conditional meanings, seem to have 
the sole function of generating their respective implications.  As Frege (1892/1966) says: 
“Subsidiary clauses beginning with ‘although’ also express complete thoughts. This conjunction 
actually has no sense and does not change the sense of the clause but only illuminates it in a 
peculiar fashion” (p. 73).6 
In what peculiar fashion does such a word illuminate the sense of a clause?  According 
to me (Lycan (1984)), there is a syntactic mechanism that is sensitive to factual presumptions.  
It is a shallow process, affecting only lexicalization.   For example, if it is presumed (by 
whomever) that the truth of S1 is in tension with that of S2,7 then the occurrence of  &  in  S1 & 
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S2  may be lexicalized as but; otherwise not.  In like wise, instead is elliptical for instead of…, and 
is a surface reflection of  &  allowed only when the speaker’s set of presumptions includes that 
one of the relevant alternatives excludes the other. 
What is wrong with each of the above “b” sentences is that the lexicalizing process has 
gone off half-cocked, operated on its own without the requisite trigger.  More generally:  If a 
sentence S1 lexically presumes a sentence S2 and S2 is false, then S1 will be heard as deviant in a 
particular way, viz., as mislexicalized.  S1 contains an inappropriately chosen word, though S1 
may still be semantically true.8     
Notice that the syntactic rule does not always merely lexicalize an existing morpheme, 
as in the cases of instead, but and who.  It can simply insert words: too, either, even.   
4.  I have spoken of factual presumptions.  But we can take the category to be wider.  It 
may include normative presumptions, so far as those are taken to be other than factual.  
Perhaps these: “He played at being department chair”; “President McKinley was assassinated 
by Czolgosz,” and for that matter “McKinley was murdered by Czolgosz” (it is sometimes said 
that “murder” truth-conditionally means “wrongful killing,” but that is not obvious); “Don’t 
send me any more of your rotten papers on conventional implicature.”  And of course we may 
further include the expressives with which we began, which are correctly lexicalized only when 
the appropriate attitude is in place: “That damn cat has pooped in the roasting pan”; “He 
fucking walked out.” 
And then there are the isolated, nonpropositional interjections, “Damn!,” “Hooray!,” 
“Uh-oh,” “Ouch,” “Yuck,” “Phew,” “Oh, dear,” “Yee-ha!” et al.  These seem to me purely 
expressive, and to be lexicalized only in a degenerate way.  There is no underlying logical form.  
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If there is a semantic representation of any kind, it is degenerate too.  But, remember, these 
are determinate words of English and not inarticulate cries.  They have interestingly various 
translations into other languages.9 
5.  And now finally to slurs and other pejorative expressions.10  The most obvious 
examples are racial, ethnic and nationality slurs:  nigger, honky, gook, kike, chink, kraut, frog, 
canuck, limey, septic tank11.  Others target other groups:  bitch, faggot, dyke, geezer, crone, 
spinster, redneck, cracker, wetback.12  Slut is a weaker case, because it characterizes a type of 
person rather than referring to a particular group.  Other pejorative expressions are not slurs, 
because they do not by themselves target groups or types at all: “That damn cat,” “your rotten 
papers.”     
(It is interesting that words that are now slurs can have begun quite innocently and only 
later come to be regarded as derogatory.  Abo is now, by Australian liberals, considered a slur 
on aboriginals, for whom the uncontroversially correct term is still aboriginal.  But it is only an 
abbreviation.  Even if we consider it as a diminutive, the “-o” form is just a standard Oz 
diminutive, used affectionately all the time, thus “Tommo” for “Thomas” instead of the 
American or British “Tommy.”13 )  
What distinguishes a slur from other expressives and from other pejoratives in particular 
is that it is semantically a referring expression, denoting a group of some sort, but also having 
derogatory expressive content.   Such “mixed” views have been defended by McCready (2010) 
and by Croom (2011, 2013).14 
The position I defend in this paper is that slurs in this sense are semantically (truth-
conditionally) equivalent to the corresponding nonpejorative terms, and differ from them only 
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by lexically presuming a negative normative belief or attitude, typically a derogatory belief or 
an attitude of contempt.15  (I do not think it would be useful to try to say more specifically what 
the negative content is; I suspect the content details vary with context.  Hom (2008) attributes 
some highly specific noncancellable content to chink, such as “ought to be subject to higher 
college admissions standards,” that is at best highly contextual and, I would say in rebuttal, 
requires contingent background knowledge for uptake; it is also, in fact, highly cancellable.16)   
What recommends the lexical presumption view is that as compared to other accounts 
of pejoratives,17 it is quite simple.  It requires neither any departure from standard truth-
conditional semantics18 nor any additional apparatus such as Kaplan’s (2004).  In fact, it does 
not require even further elaboration, but only some replies to objections. 
6.  Bach (1999) (cf. Carston (2002)) maintains that there is no such thing as conventional 
implicature in the first place.  That would be an objection, all right, assuming as I have that 
lexical presumption is a species of conventional implicature.  Bach argues that words like but do 
not always scope out of indirect quotation: 
(14) Marv said that Shaq is huge but he is agile. 
And he puts forward a principle he calls “the IQ test” (p. 340):  “An element of a sentence 
contributes to what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an 
accurate and complete indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which 
includes that element, or a corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is 
said.”  Thus, the contrastive implication of but is attributed to Marv, not undertaken by the 
speaker, and it contributes to what was said by Marv.   
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Secondly (pp. 345ff), Bach assimilates conventionally-implicating words to nonrestrictive 
relative clauses, appositives, and parentheticals:  “Ann’s computer, which she bought in 1992, 
crashes frequently.”  “Beth’s husband, a plumber, never washes the dishes.”  “Shaq is huge, 
and, unlike most huge people, he is agile.”  Though such secondary materials are intuitively not 
asserted and are not the main points of their respective utterances, they are obviously truth-
conditional and the speaker is however secondarily committed to their truth.  They are said.    
Bach maintains that a sentence containing a conventionally-implicating word expresses 
two separate propositions, as opposed to their conjunction, one secondary and not much 
influencing people’s judgment of the sentence’s truth-value.  (He spends some time bashing the 
idea that a sentence can express only one proposition at a time.)   
But it should be noted that conventional-implicature views entirely agree with that, 
except so far as “express” is meant to contrast with “noncancellably implicate.”  Of course there 
are two propositions, one primary and carrying the burden of truth assessment, the other 
secondary and requiring at least a little backing-up or circumlocution if one wants to resist it.  
That was precisely Grice’s view.  The question is whether Bach’s two arguments against Grice 
succeed. 
 Vs. the IQ test:  First, Bach’s data are disputed by Anderson and Lepore (2013, p. 35), 
who are officially neutral but rather think that but et al. damn well do scope out of all 
embeddings including those of indirect speech.  I myself think sentences such as (14) can be 
heard either way depending on intonation, but that does not show that each of those 
understandings is semantically correct.19  Moreover, second, I believe that the IQ test’s 
biconditional, specifically Bach’s sufficient condition, is too strong.  Even if we grant that (14) 
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has a correct narrow-scope reading, it should not follow that Marv’s contrastive implication was 
said.  Marv did not say that being huge tends to inhibit being agile. 
Bach’s point about his assimilations (which have become quite common in the 
conventional-implicature literature, notably in Potts (2005)) is easily rebutted by me, because 
they do not apply to lexical presumptions in particular.   I completely agree with Bach that 
nonrestrictive relatives et al. are compositional, thoroughly truth-conditional, and said.20  But 
the same is not true of lexical presumptions, which are by definition not compositional and 
according to my view, not truth-conditional either. 
7.  Kaplan (2004) revisits Dummett’s (1973) question of logical validity, though in model-
theoretic terms rather than Dummett’s inferentialist ones.  He points to an intuitive difference 
between “That damn Kaplan was promoted / Kaplan was promoted” and “Kaplan was 
promoted / That damn Kaplan was promoted”; the former is intuitively valid but the latter 
intuitively invalid.21  Kaplan argues that we should reconsider our notion of logical 
consequence, and not simply define it in terms of truth-preservation.  He goes on to develop a 
notion of “semantic information” that includes both descriptive or factual content and 
expressive content. 
But there is here no objection to the lexical presumption theory of pejoratives, for the 
same issue arises in ordinary, nonpejorative cases of lexical presumption.  “Mr. Blifil was sober / 
Even Mr. Blifil was sober.”  “Jane just added 2 and 2 and got 6, and her husband is very 
brilliant  /  Jane just added 2 and 2 and got 6, and her husband is very brilliant too.”  The 
conclusions carry information that the premises did not.  Whatever is the best solution to 
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Kaplan’s puzzle about validity, it will apply equally to lexical presumption examples.  Indeed, 
that tends to confirm the view that pejoratives are cases of lexical presumption.   
8.  Williamson (2009) anticipates a very pertinent objection to any conventional-
implicature approach: that since implicature of any sort is a matter of what is communicated by 
a public speech act in a social context, an account featuring it will not carry over to silent, 
private thought; yet we can and do think pejoratively.  (A similar point afflicts implicature 
theories of metaphor (Lycan (2006)); and obviously there are sarcastic and other ironic thought 
as well.)   
I do not entirely understand Williamson’s reply.  He maintains that pejorativeness is still 
essentially communicative, and that there are communicative phenomena in thought, “in silent 
communication with oneself” (p. xx26xx); “one manipulates the rhetorical effect of one’s own 
thoughts on oneself.”  I cannot tell whether Williamson thinks there is a deeper level of thought 
that is flatly literal and merely propositional.  But this is a genuine issue that deserves at least a 
long separate discussion: communicative phenomena in thought that are not literally 
communicative.  Being a general issue, it does not afford a specific complaint against the lexical 
presumption theory of pejoratives.         
9.  My view is a species of what Hom (2008) and Croom (2011) call “pragmatic 
minimalism”:  A slur has a descriptive meaning given by its truth-conditional intension, and/but 
it also conventionally implicates something derogatory.22  Hom and Croom offer three 
objections to such accounts.  First, “since the pragmatic mininmalist holds…that the terms 
African American and nigger have the same literal meaning,…  they seem committed to the 
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view that racist claims such as “African Americans are niggers” literally express analytic truths 
that are knowable a priori” (Croom, p. 352).   
Second, since conventional implicatures are not cancellable, “[d]erogation ought to 
occur in every context of use for epithets without any means for cancellation” (Hom, p. 424).  
But at least in cases of “appropriation,” genuine and felicitous uses of slurs are not derogatory.   
Third, slurs are sometimes felicitously applied to individuals who are not members of 
the official extension.  Nigger has occasionally been applied to white people, and faggot to 
heterosexual men.  (Croom, p. 352) 
These objections may have force against some instances of pragmatic minimalism, but 
they have none against my version.   Ad the first, on the lexical presumption view, a slur and its 
neutral counterpart do not have the same literal meaning, but only the same truth-conditional 
contribution.   One might as well say that “If Mr. Blifil was sober, then even Mr. Blifil was sober” 
is analytic; cf. our discussion of Kaplan on valid inference (section 7 above). 
    The second objection needs answering, I agree; that will be the work of section 12 
below. 
The phenomenon that prompts the third objection is real, certainly, but at least in each 
case cited by Croom, the use of the slur is clearly analogical predication.  When someone 
speaks of “white niggers,” s/he is analogically transferring the nigger stereotype to white 
people who uncharacteristically fit it.  And so for faggot and the gay male stereotype. 
10.   DiFranco (2015) unveils a new class of data:  There are slurs that are not single 
words but have compositional structure.  Slanty-eyed, raghead, jungle bunny, trailer 
trash, curry muncher (that last was a new one on me).   
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DiFranco has an iconoclastic purpose: he means to oppose the received view that 
every slur has a neutral counterpart to which it is truth-conditionally equivalent to that 
of its neutral counterpart.   He argues that his compositional slurs are counterexamples, 
precisely because they are compositional.  For example, slanty-eyed truth-conditionally 
means having eyes with epicanthic folds, or at least eyes that slant, but the slurring use 
of that term does not literally entail concepts of those kinds. 
I have no complete reply to this.  It seems clear that the slurring uses of such 
compositional terms are idioms.  Just as kicked the bucket entails nothing about a(n 
actual) bucket, jungle bunny entails nothing about a(n actual) jungle, and certainly 
nothing about bunnies.  But I know of no particularly good tests for idiomhood, and so I 
cannot show decisively why DiFranco’s apparently compositional examples are not after 
all compositional. 
11.  Anderson and Lepore (2013) make two objections to conventional-implicature 
accounts of slurs.  First, like Bach and Potts they appeal to the assimilation of conventional-
implicature terms to complex compositional constructions, which as we have seen does not 
apply to the lexical presumption account.    
Second, they cite “inert” sentential (not conversational) contexts, a paradigm of which is 
direct quotation.  Inside direct quotation, seemingly, all forms of meaning or content are 
neutralized:  “She said ‘Familiarity breeds attempt’”; “He said, ‘We’re all cremated equal’”; and 
of course we are reminded by Davidson (1986) that Mrs. Malaprop spoke of a “nice 
derangement of epitaphs.”  If I quote someone as uttering (4b) above, I in no way commit 
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myself to there being a contrast or tension between proving Goldbach’s Conjecture and being 
smart.  Yet slurs project their offensiveness even out of direct quotation, just as do taboo 
words.  (Thus even if Bach is right that conventionally-implicating words sometimes fail to 
scope out of speech contexts, slurs are not among those that do.) 
To that I reply that so far as slurs do project their offensiveness, then not all forms of 
content have been neutralized.  Slurs imply such properties as contemptibility, or at least they 
conventionally express the speaker’s contemptuous attitude.  
Anderson and Lepore anticipate and consider an objection to their own view (which 
view is that slurs are taboo words, offensive because they are prohibited, not the other way 
around23):  Hornsby (2001), Richard (2008) and Hom (2008) have claimed that there are 
inoffensive, nonderogatory, nonslurring uses of slurs, such as  
(15)  He is not a nigger. [Metalinguistic negation, meant to chide a racist speaker who 
has used the word.24] [Hornsby, p. 129] 
(16)  He said that I was a nigger.  [Spoken by an African-American.]   [Richard, p. 13] 
(Or better, 
(17)  He called me a nigger. ) 
(18)  Institutions that treat Chinese people as chinks are racist.  [Hom, p. 429]     
If these uses are indeed inoffensive, that embarrasses Anderson and Lepore’s view that 
slurs are simply taboo words whose prohibitedness projects out of any linguistic context.  
Unfortunately, it also would impugn the lexical presumption account, since according to that 
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account, lexical presumptions are carried by particular words and are part of those words’ 
meanings. 
Anderson and Lepore make one general response on their own behalf, and one 
concession (p. 41).  The response is that even (15)-(18) are at best iffy and ill-chosen and should 
not be used in print or other formal contexts.  “Reporters do not usually get a pass.”  They go 
on to cite famous cases (see again Kennedy (2002)) in which a speaker used a slur when it was 
very clear he did so in critique of racist etc. views and with no intention to offend, but did 
seriously offend and suffered consequences.  
However, notice that Anderson and Lepore have played on the fact that (15)-(17), at 
least, feature a word that in contemporary America is considered the worst of slurs and taboo 
indeed.  If they had used “frog” or “limey,” the intuition would not be nearly as strong.    
Still, to the extent that “frog” and “limey” are offensively pejorative, they are iffy and ill-
chosen and should not be used at least in print.  I am inclined to agree with Anderson and 
Lepore’s judgment.  (But see section 13 below.) 
Their concession is that “appropriation” or reclamation of a slur such as nigger, dyke or 
queer can render its uses, at least by members of the relevant oppressed groups in particular 
contexts, unpejorative and even positive.  This phenomenon merits a section unto itself. 
12.  First we must distinguish it from that of mock insult as between close friends 
(Culpeper, 1996).   Such friends can rail at each other using offensive terms without giving 
offense, indeed sometimes deepening their friendship.  “That’s just like you, you evil shit” (said 
with a smile).  Slurs of course can be used in this way.  But that is not the reclamatory use that 
Anderson and Lepore (following others such as Tirrell (1999)) have conceded.   N.b., contra 
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Croom (2011, pp. 350, 352), it is a derogatory use.  Evil shit, nigger, faggot and such are flatly 
derogatory terms, and mock insults are mock insults.  The moral is, again, that among close 
friends, derogatory terms can be wielded without actually giving offense.  But let us turn to 
reclamation proper.  
Given the above qualification (“at least by members…”), it seems beyond dispute that 
reclamation happens.  Moreover, a reclamation project can in principle succeed globally, in 
such a way that what has been a slur becomes no longer a slur.  Sometime during the 1960s, 
African-Americans (then politely called “Negroes”) reclaimed black, which had been a slur, 
under the slogan “Black is beautiful,” and I believe black is now still no slur though African-
American may be preferred.  Queer is doing reasonably well, as nowadays anyone may refer to 
the field of queer studies or to queer culture or to queer issues; but it would still be quite 
offensive to refer to a gay couple as “a pair of queers.”  (The noun seems to be worse than the 
adjective.)   
An interesting current case is that of the controversy over the Washington Redskins’ 
name.  Liberals have complained for some years that redskin is a slur.  Certainly its original use 
was not a polite one, though I do not believe it was ever in a class with nigger or kike.  But it is 
clear that the Washington football team’s appropriation of it was indeed an appropriation, i.e., 
an attempt at reclamation.  As Paul Calobrisi (co-founder of www.savethewashingtonredskins) 
has put it, “Cowboys and Indians, we were the Indians.”25  But the team’s management, staff 
and players are not the targeted group, so the reclamation is vicarious, which is generally not 
allowed.26        
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Anderson and Lepore suggest, reasonably, that taboos can be relativized to groups and 
that exceptions can sometimes be made by members of targeted groups for nonmembers 
(pp. 42-43).  But as always they insist this is not a matter of meaning or other content. 
On the lexical presumption view, the presence or absence of a presumption is indeed a 
matter of conventional meaning, though not of truth-condition, so pejorativeness is part of 
meaning.  Therefore, I contend that a successful reclamation project produces a meaning 
change.27  The nonslurring user of what would otherwise be a slur is speaking in an at least 
slightly different dialect from that of the surrounding majority.  The slur does not mean in 
her/his mouth what it does in mainstream dialects (though as always it has the same truth-
condition).  –Nor is this response at all ad hoc; the lexical presumption view originally and 
always has been, in part, that lexical presumptions are elements of an expression’s meaning. 
Anderson and Lepore object (p. 42) that an ambiguity view “fails to explain why non-
members cannot use a second sense. If it were just a matter of distinct meanings, why can’t any 
speaker opt to use a slur non-offensively?”  
Good question, but I believe the answer is that some dialects themselves are closely 
guarded by the self-conscious and sensitive groups whose distinctive dialects they are.  Such a 
group inhabits one of the islands that make up North Carolina’s Outer Banks.28  I shall call them 
“Ur-islanders.”  They are roughly descendants of the original European settlers of the island 
ca. 1750, chiefly pilots and other seafaring people, though by no means all such descendants 
qualify as Ur-islanders.  The Ur-islanders keep very much to themselves and do not willingly 
interact with other inhabitants of the island, not even with those who are themselves of the old 
families and may have lived on the island for several generations.  The latter do the jobs that 
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involve dealing with the mainly tourist public—shopkeeping, running restaurants and fishing 
tour boats, etc.  The Ur-islanders pursue solitary activities, mainly fishing but also gardening, 
hunting and a little trading.  They are all too aware that the island’s economy is now based 
almost entirely on the tourist trade, and they want no part of that except for the income that 
derives from selling their catch and produce to the island’s distributors. 
The Ur-islanders speak a highly distinctive dialect.  It is one of the many dialects found in 
pockets of the American southeast that popular culture has claimed survives straight from the 
Globe Theatre, but in fact it derives primarily from the south and west of England, with a bit of 
Irish, some mainland U.S. southern vowels, and some 18th-century Native American vocabulary 
mixed in.  It is a fascinating dialect to hear. 
Sometimes a non-Ur- inhabitant (less often, a regular tourist visitor) will decide to try to 
build a bridge to the Ur-islanders, in the interest of wider community, and will start by 
identifying one or more particular Ur-islanders, doing what it takes to make their acquaintance 
and trying to get to know them.  In recent years this has sometimes worked, and cautious 
friendships have developed.  But suppose the bridge-builder were bonhomously to accost 
her/his new acquaintance and make an attempt at Ur-islandish, using Ur-islandish vocabulary 
and affecting the accent.  That would still be very offensive.  Possibly this is because it would be 
heard as mockery, but it is more because a non-Ur-islander is simply not part of the Ur-
islanders’ community and has no right to presume on their dialect.  (“Hey, I’m one of you!”—
“No, you’re [Ur-island expletive] not,” implication “…and you should have known that.”) 
You can see where this is going.  Contra Anderson and Lepore, a dialect difference is not 
just one of distinct meanings.  It need not be one of distinct meanings at all.  Nor is it confined 
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to pejoratives; it may not even include them.  What offends is, presuming to speak the 
protected dialect that is not one’s own.  And that is what a well-meaning, nonracist user of 
nigger is doing when s/he attempts to express solidarity with American black people who use it 
among themselves.29 
 
13.  In the spirit of (14), (17) and (18) above, Hom (2012) offers more challenging 
examples of alleged narrow-scoping pejoratives, in which the pejorative implications are 
displaced from the speaker.      
(19)  John is not a bastard.  (He’s extremely nice.)   [p. 387]                   
(20)  If John fucks up another case, then he will be fired.  (But I don’t think he will 
because he’s working much harder now.)       [p. 388] 
(21)  My father told me that I could not marry that damn Brad.   [ibid.; Kratzer (1999)]    
(22)  I’m not prejudiced against Caucasians.  But John, who is, {thinks / claims} that you 
are the worst honky he knows.   [ibid.] 
(19) is a straightforward case of factual denial, combined if you like with (cf. (15) above) 
metalinguistic negation directed upon the expressive lexical presumption of bastard over and 
above the literal extension of, mean and unscrupulous person.   (20) seems to me plainly wide-
scoping; the pejorative is still in the speaker’s mouth.  The speaker’s qualification continues it, 
and does not displace it: “I don’t think he will fuck up another case….”  
(21) and (22) cause the real problem, and I agree it is one.  Damn in (21) is obviously in 
the father’s mouth and not in the speaker’s; ditto honky and John in (22).  Both smack of direct 
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quotation.  Indeed, if direct quotation were not intended, the speaker would after all be 
responsible for the pejorative.  It seems, then, that contra Anderson and Lepore, pejorativeness 
can be nullified by embedding.  Yet it was supposed to project even out of direct quotation.  
Again, I agree with Hom that there is a puzzle here.  But the present question is, 
whether the puzzle afflicts the lexical-presumption theory of slurs in particular.  It does not.  For 
the same puzzling constructions displace undisputed lexical presumptions; in the following 
sentences, the presumptions are not, or not obviously, taken over by the speaker.   
(23)  My father told me that Jane is a neat housekeeper and she doesn’t take baths 
either.   
(24)  My father told me that Jane just added 2 and 2 and got 6, and that her husband is 
very brilliant too. 
(25)  My father told me that although Jane is very lucky, she is very happy. 
(26)  You and I know that Mr. Blifil is as teetotal as they come, but John said that even 
Blifil was sober. 
(27)  That crazy John said that Jane considered taking a pleasant ride [etc.] but decided 
to enjoy her day off instead. 
I do not much like (23)-(27).  But I do not like (21) or (22) either, for much the same 
reasons.  There is a nearly perfect parallel between Hom’s pejorative cases and standard 
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Footnotes   
1 Alert readers will have recognized this opening as an allusion to Dorothy Sayers’ first novel, which famously 
began: “`Oh, damn!’ said Lord Peter Wimsey at Piccadilly Circus” (often misquoted as just “`Damn!’ said Lord Peter 
Wimsey”).   
 
2 But not “I don’t give a damn” or “It doesn’t matter a damn.”  In those, “damn” is a misspelling of dam, a noun, 
meaning an otherwise useless wad of wet paper or the like used to plug a hole in a metal item being repaired by a 
tinker. 
I conjecture that damn as adjective is a shortening of damned, a participle.    
 
3 “He is an Englishman; he is therefore brave,” the alleged implicature being carried by “therefore.”  But 
“therefore” makes a straightforwardly truth-conditional contribution; it means “for that reason.”   —Actually that 
is far too simple; see Neta (2013).  
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4 Lakoff offered this and related data in support of his claim that a sentence may be syntactically deviant 
depending on contingent ways the world might be.  Lycan (1984) argued that that is true only in a narrow sense, 
and that it cannot be used to defend the idea of semantic presupposition.   
  
5 Cf. Dudman (1984), “Even Grannie is sober.”  Actually I myself have argued (Lycan (2001), Chs. 5 and 6) that 
“even” makes a substantive truth-conditional contribution, but this remains a minority position; I here insincerely 
assume the majority view. 
 
6 Frege continues:  “We could indeed replace the concessive clause without harm to the truth of the whole by 
another of the same truth value; but the light in which the clause is placed by the conjunction might then easily 
appear unsuitable, as if a song with a sad subject were to be sung in a lively fashion.”   A lovely analogy, but 
inaccurate; the lively singing would be bad interpretation and bad style, but the use of “although” when there is no 
relevant tension is flatly incorrect.   
And cf. Frege’s remarks on “tone.”  He contrasts “cur” with “dog” (1979), though they have not only the 
same reference but the same sense. 
 
7 Interestingly, the tension may be of contextually different sorts; see Bach (1999). 
 
8 Lexical presumption inherits at least six things from Grice’s cursory characterization of conventional implicature 
(ibid.):  (i) It is not calculated as conversational implicatures are, but is determined by “the conventional meaning 
of the words used.”  (ii) In asserting a sentence that conventionally implicates that p, “I have certainly committed 
myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that” p.  (iii) And as noted, that commitment is 
noncancellable.  (iv) But in uttering such a sentence I have not actually said that p.  (v) Accordingly, my utterance is 
not “STRICTLY SPEAKING, false” if it is not the case that p.  (vi) Lexical presumptions are “detachable” in Grice’s 
sense: A sentence S1 that presumes S2 may be logically equivalent to an S3 that does not presume S2.   
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Some more recent versions of “conventional implicature” are far more ambitious and wide-ranging, most 
notably those of Potts (2005) and Deigan (2013).  Potts includes some phenomena inherited from the confused old 
“semantic presupposition” literature, such as nonrestrictive relative clauses and such sentence adverbs as 
“unfortunately.”  Deigan turns to dynamic semantics, as in Roberts (1996) and Yalcin (2013).  N.b., again, none of 
this is or could be an incorrect account of “conventional implicature”; pragmatics has variously moved on from 
Grice’s paragraph and profitably so.       
 
9 As do English representations of animal utterances, e.g., “meow,” “arf,” “baa,” “cluck, cluck,” and “moo.” 
 
10 Concern with these goes back at least to Dummett (1973). 
 
11 Old Australian rhyming slang for yank (American).  Bluenose is a very old term for Nova Scotians, but I do not 
know whether it was ever a slur. 
    
12 For an extensive catalogue, see Saka (2007), p. 144. 
 
13 I confess I do not see why it is considered a slur, though if it is considered one, it is considered one, and a Google 
search confirms that it now very definitely is.  (I do realize that diminutives can be demeaning, as can even mere 
abbreviations such as Hebe.)  Likewise Chinaman for male Chinese; that is not even a diminutive, and Englishman 
and Frenchman are hardly slurs.  I do not know whether the older, flatter aborigine is regarded as a slur; I have not 
heard it uttered in some years.  Fesl (1986) asks that it be capitalized.  Indigenous has been proposed, but is 
severely controversial among aboriginals themselves.  
In fact, the unutterable nigger itself may have come from the if anything extra-polite Negro, meant to 
replace black before black was reclaimed (see below).  In America, it would seem, the “n-” word is just white 
southern dialect pronunciation of Negro.  (I might have said “white southern dumbass,” quoting the novelist Dan 
Jenkins, but that would have been a slur.)  Yet the word is very old in the UK, and apparently its origin is unknown 
(Kennedy, 2002)).  For all I know, Negro was a cleaning-up of nigger.   
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                Interestingly, in recent American writing, the word slave has been used less willingly, in favor of enslaved 
person and the like—as if it were not tautologous that a slave is a person who has been enslaved. 
In some cases it seems no euphemism can succeed.  I am thinking of determined liberal attempts to 
replace handicapped and disabled.   Every replacement has quickly become a slur or at least considered 
offensive.  The most recent one I know is differently abled, which is not or not yet a slur, but is so affected that 
anyone should be ashamed to use it.  The moral seems to be that referring at all to the class in question is at least 
mildly offensive.  The late playwright Reynolds Price, crippled by spinal cancer, said (2003) he had never met any 
handicapped person who was not positively offended by euphemisms.  His own preferred term was gimp, but he 
noted that one of his gimp friends had an excellent euphemism for the non-handicapped: temporarily abled. 
 
14 Croom (2011) argues painstakingly and decisively against a purely descriptive, nonexpressive account of slurs, 
though he does not cite anyone as having held such a view.  He goes on to criticize purely expressive, 
nondescriptive accounts, and apparently that needed doing (vs. Kratzer (1999), Potts (2007); and see Hedger 
(2102)), though as Croom shows, such accounts are simply untenable. 
 Blakemore (forthcoming) insists that slurs have both descriptive meanings and expressive implications, 
but argues that the latter are pragmagtically generated through the use of metalinguistic background knowledge. 
 It is interesting that purely expressive common nouns can be invented on the spot, yet easily understood 
as such.  “’Andy! You geck! You gink!’  Marcus K. Hoot’s voice rang and echoed through the lonely bungalow. ‘You 
locoed bonehead, Andy! Show up, you dog-goned gump!’  Mr. Hoot was a little excited.”  (Lord Billy Bunter, by 
Frank Richards, Cassell & Co. Ltd., London, 1956, p. 133.)   Slurs can be invented on the spot too, but their intended 
descriptive content is an aid there both to production and to understanding. 
 
15 Tirrell (1999) points out that the relevant belief or attitude may not be the speaker’s own personal one.  It may 
be only that which has accumulated historically in the speaker’s linguistic community.  Tirrell argues for a 
Brandomian social-inferential-role theory of slurs. 
  
16 Croom (2011, p. 350) makes this point also. 
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 Saka (2007, p. 148) offers the illuminating suggestion that variation as between slurs in their exact 
negative implications is due to the differing historical circumstances from which they arose.    
 
17 For a survey of early views, see Saka (2007), Ch. 5. 
 
18 A very strict truth-conditional theorist would insist that but means exactly the same as and.  As I choose to use 
the “m-“word, that is not so.  See section 9 below. 
   
19 If the narrow-scope readings are semantically sound, that would require a significant syntactic complication in 
my account of lexical presumption, since the lexicalizing would then not straightforwardly constitute a word choice 
made by the speaker. 
 Croom (2011) offers an explanation of why lexical-presumption-generating words do in general scope out:  
“[T]he choice of which words one accepts as legitimate for use comes prior to the choice of what one will in turn 
use those words to say, and so the speaker’s choice of acceptable terms itself out-scopes their choice of the 
particular positions in which they choose to place those terms within their utterance” (p. 346).  
   
20 Lycan (1984) went so far as to maintain that they are conjuncts. 
 
21 There is an obviously related issue about logical truths:  “Either Kaplan is a honky or he isn’t,” supposed to be 
intuitively not a logical truth.  Here I tentatively share the intuition, but only because I tend to hear the negation as 
metalinguistic negation in the sense of Horn (1985).   
And there is an obviously related issue about T-sentences: they cannot be homophonic.  “’Kaplan is a 
honky’ is true iff Kaplan is a honky” is offensive, and its RHS would have to be replaced by “Kaplan is a Caucasian.”  
(Which leaves something out, but on the lexical presumption view, nothing about truth.)   However, contra 
Davidson, T-sentences could never have been homophonic in the first place (Lycan (1984), Chs. 2 and 3).    
Also, as in the case of taboo words, the expressive features of expressives tend to persist through 
embedding and even through direct quotation.   More on this below. 
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22 My lexical presumption view is then closely related to the pragmatic minimalism of McCready (2010). 
 
23 For extended critique of the view, see Deigan (2013). 
 
24 Notice that the negation must be metalinguistic.  In “Is this Lycan fellow a nigger?”—“No, he’s not a nigger,” the 
word is again offensive.    
     
25 “What is a Slur? And Who Decides it is?,” article by Jesse Washington, AP National Writer, The Day (New London, 
CT), June 22, 2014. 
  
26 On June 18, 2014 the Trademark and Appeal Board decided 2-1 that redskin is “disparaging to Native 
Americans.”  They made three general points:   (1) That only the views of the targeted group matter; other groups’ 
opinions and attitudes are irrelevant.   (2) That a “substantial” proportion of Native Americans must be offended.  
The judges set the threshold at 30%.  (3) That slurring does not require intent (which neutralizes Calobrisi’s 
undoubtedly heartfelt justification, and which is certainly right).   I infer that some sort of poll was conducted and 
showed that at least 30% of Native Americans are offended. 
Interestingly, to my knowledge no one has complained about the name of the Cleveland Indians (baseball 
team), though Indians has long been considered politically incorrect and replaced by Native Americans.  It does 
seem that redskin is at least a mild slur in way that Indian is not.  I suspect the liberal objection to Indian is only 
that it is Eurocentric. 
  
27 In this I am preceded by Tirrell (1999), Kaplan (2004), Saka (2007), Richard (2008), and Hom (2008). 
 
28 This story is complicated, and in certain fear of factual error I will fictionalize it here.  But the known and 
unknown departures from fact do not matter for my dialectical purposes; a hypothetical community to which my 
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fictional description does apply will do as well to make my point.  For a more accurate but incomplete account of 
the real group that inspired the fiction, see Wolfram and Schilling-Estes (1997).  
   
29 To appeal to meaning change as alone inducing dialect difference would have been only to put the problem off:  
Of course if two people use the same words with different meanings, then to that extent they speak different 
dialects; that is tautologous and the reference to dialect adds nothing.  One must add, as I have, a story about the 
significance of dialect difference. 
 
30 In fact, it is already known that there are what Stephen Levinson (2000) calls “intrusive constructions,” operators 
that yield compound sentences whose truth-conditions depend on conversational implicatures rather than the 
truth-conditions of the operands:  “Driving home and drinking several beers is better than drinking several beers 
and driving home”; “If each side in the soccer game got three goals, then the game was a draw”; “She either got 
married and had a child, or had a child and got married; I don’t know which”; “Because the police have recovered 
some of the gold, they will no doubt recover the lot.”  Carston (2002) argues that Relevance Theory can handle 
such data even though traditional Gricetheorie cannot. 
 
31 For incisive and helpful comments on my originally submitted draft, I am indebted to each of two anonymous 
reviewers for Language Sciences, one of whom went out of her/his way to provide a detailed list of works on the 
present topic that I had left out of account or never seen at all.  I have revised in light of nearly all the referees’ 
comments, but not as thoroughly as I wish I could have. 
